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DESIRE, CONSERVATISM, UNDERFUNDING, CONGRESSIONAL
MEDDLING, AND STUDY FATIGUE: INGREDIENTS FOR
ONGOING REFORM AT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION?
Joan MacLeod Heminway

In the spring of 2010, after two years of significant reform efforts
undertaken to address perceived weaknesses in its rulemaking and
enforcement activities (alleged failings that have been blamed for the
financial crisis and Bernie Madoff debacle), the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was rewarded for its efforts with a
congressional provision in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act)1 that compels ongoing
reform efforts based on the results of a third-party examination.
Not later than the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this subtitle, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the “SEC”) shall hire an
independent consultant of high caliber and with expertise in
organizational restructuring and the operations of capital markets to
examine the internal operations, structure, funding, and the need for
comprehensive reform of the SEC, as well as the SEC’s relationship with
and the reliance on self-regulatory organizations and other entities
relevant to the regulation of securities and the protection of securities
investors that are under the SEC’s oversight.2

This is the text that introduces the general mandate of Section 967 of the
Dodd–Frank Act (Section 967). The section goes on to prescribe
general areas of study and require that the independent consultant render
a report to the SEC and the U.S. Congress “[n]ot later than the end of
the 150-day period after being retained.”3 That report—256 pages, not
including the cover page, table of contents, and glossary (BCG
Report)—was issued on March 10, 2011, over three years before work

 W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law;
J.D., New York University School of Law; A.B., Brown University. Work on this Article was
supported by thoughtful comments from Arthur Laby and members of the faculty at Suffolk University
Law School and by research funding from The University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.dodd-frank-act.us/Dodd_Frank_
Act_Text_Section_967.html.
2. Id. § 967(a)(1).
3. Id. §§ 967(a)(2), 967(b).

443

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

444

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

on this Article was completed.4
Having earlier written about SEC reform efforts in recent years and
having been interested—in fact, amazed—by the number and type of
studies included in the Dodd–Frank Act,5 I began to wonder whether
Section 967 and the resulting BCG Report were, are, and will be useful
and efficient. Did Congress make the right decision in the Dodd–Frank
Act about how to approach the need for ongoing, targeted reforms at the
SEC to make it a more functional, effectual regulatory agency? I
initially had to admit that I was unclear on the best way to answer that
question, but I knew I wanted to try. I started my inquiry with what I
already knew. My existing knowledge led me to a number of
observations at the intersection of the SEC’s then existing reform efforts
and Section 967.
In prior works on the topic of SEC reform, I used change leadership
literature (a branch of business management scholarship) to assess the
potential success of the SEC’s ongoing efforts to restructure itself and
its operations.6 In these articles, I contended that the SEC’s pre-Dodd–
Frank and early post-Dodd–Frank reform efforts bear earmarks of
potential success based on various factors catalogued in change
leadership literature.7 I noted, in the more recent of the two articles, that
former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro’s public communications about
the BCG Report just prior to its release were evidence of her possible
status as a wartime leader, a type of leader that may be successful in
making lasting institutional reforms.8 I further observed that the
institutional study that resulted in the BCG Report appeared to help
develop or restore interconnections among personnel in the SEC that
may be important to successful organizational change:
The recent examination of SEC operations conducted by the Boston
Consulting Group (BCG), required under the Dodd–Frank Act, reengaged the SEC’s staff in the ongoing reform dialogue (by incorporating
4. BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM (2011) [hereinafter BCG Report], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf.
5. Joan Heminway, Dodd–Frank Forum—And Now for Something Completely Different,
CONGLOMERATE (July 21, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/07/doddfrank-forum-and-nowfor-something-completely-different.html.
6. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and Reforming the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Lessons from Literature on Change Leadership, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 627, 630 (2010)
[hereinafter Heminway, Reframing], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688147; Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Sustaining Reform Efforts at the SEC: A Progress Report, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y
REP.
1,
1
(2011)
[hereinafter
Heminway,
Sustaining],
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859045.
7. See Heminway, Reframing, supra note 6, at 659; Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 1–
9.
8. Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 2.
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staff input) and, in the process, accorded credit to diverse viewpoints,
encouraged transparency and feedback relating to ongoing reforms, and
reconnected members of the SEC staff to the agency and its efforts to
transform itself. Although the study was conducted by a third party
engaged by the SEC rather than directly by the SEC leadership, the work
done by BCG re-enforced and extended earlier work done by SEC leaders
in their self-assessments of aspects of SEC operations. The common
element of these efforts is staff engagement in the organizational change
process, as opposed to top-down imposition of reforms—the treatment of
the SEC as a living system, not a machine.9

Finally, I noted that the BCG Report and the related congressional
mandates of periodic reporting in the Dodd–Frank Act (which call for
reports to Congress at six-month intervals over a period of two years)10
should help to sustain the SEC’s focus on aligning and clarifying its
organizational structure, another established element of successful
organizational change.11 These observations lend some analysis to the
question of whether Section 967 is efficacious and tend to support the
view that that Section 967 and the BCG Report may be effectual. But
they are preliminary and incomplete observations.
I also observed that, despite the SEC’s honest and open desire to
improve itself, the nature of the SEC itself—sometimes portrayed as an
inflexible, officious government unit—might complicate the effective
and efficient implementation of Section 967 and the overall prospects
for success in the SEC’s reform efforts. There may be two opposing
forces at work in the area of SEC institutional reform in the postfinancial-crisis era, with the outcome of that opposition being uncertain:
9. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
10. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 967(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Specifically, these
congressional reporting requirements last for two years after the issuance of the BCG Report (i.e.,
through March 2013).
Not later than the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date the consultant issues
the report under subsection (b), and every 6-months thereafter during the 2-year period
following the date on which the consultant issues such report, the SEC shall issue a
report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate describing the SEC’s
implementation of the regulatory and administrative recommendations contained in the
consultant’s report.
Id. Three reports have been issued to date. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 30, 2012) [hereinafter March 2012 SEC
Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/secorgreformreport-2012-df967.pdf; SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM
RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter September 2011 SEC Report], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/secorgreformreport-df967.pdf; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 17, 2012)
[hereinafter October 2012 SEC Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/secorganizational-reform-recommendations-101712.pdf.
11. Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 7.
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First is the sincere desire, especially among senior policymakers, to
effect meaningful, thoughtful, and progressive regulatory change. The
crisis caused many within the agencies to rethink the priorities and
processes of regulation, and has strengthened the hand of those most
inclined to ask difficult questions, challenge the status quo, and try new
ideas.
Set against this progressive force is the deep conservatism of the
agencies themselves. The federal agencies that supervise banks and
oversee capital markets are highly regimented and bureaucratic.
Information, insight, and warning signs are often not acted on or shared
without first being reviewed and approved at each level of the
organizational hierarchy. Among different agencies, competing agendas
can sometimes win out over close cooperation. New rules will of course
be developed as required, but new attitudes and new ways of working
will be harder to come by.12

This complex, dissonant characterization of the SEC—as open-minded
and reformist, yet also conservative, hierarchical, and slow-moving—
rings true to me. One legal commentator once noted that “[w]e can
compare U.S. government policy changes to the navigation of a
supertanker. One does not see the results of any effort to back water or
change course for a considerable time.”13
Another apparent counterweight to the SEC’s desire for reform has
been a lack of sufficient resources. Financial capital and human capital
at the SEC are in relatively short supply (and have been deficient during
the entire reform period). The underfunding of the SEC has been a
matter of public debate at a number of junctures during the recent SEC
reform process and, as I have noted elsewhere, threatens to impede the
implementation of reform initiatives.14 Specifically, the scarcity of
funding to support follow-through on study findings under the Dodd–
Frank Act may mean that the prescribed studies will merely constitute
legislative relics.
The timing of Congress’s enactment of Section 967 is an additional
possible area of concern. Why interrupt an existing reform campaign to
evaluate it or start a new one? To the extent that Section 967 can be
seen as an extension (rather than an interruption) of the reform work
begun by former Chairman Schapiro and other SEC leaders,15 why
impose new processes on the organization and its change leaders—

12. JOHN LESTER & JOHN BOVENZI, THE DODD–FRANK ACT: WHAT IT DOES, WHAT IT MEANS,
WHAT
HAPPENS
NEXT
7
(2010),
available
at
http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/OW_EN_FS_Publ_2010_The_Dodd_Frank_Act.pdf.
13. William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the Reagan Years (1980–89):
The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645, 647 (1994).
14. Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 9–12.
15. See Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 6.
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adding cost to the reform process by requiring the retention of an outside
expert for an initial assessment and diverting the time of the SEC’s
leadership and staff to engage in programmatic self-assessment by
participating in a study and ongoing reporting? “Might the SEC have
done just as well in continuing on the road to reform it had been on preDodd–Frank? . . . .”16
Finally, I noted that Section 967 is only one among many legislative
provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act that call for the completion of studies
and related action by or at the SEC in addition to the substantive
rulemaking provided for under the Dodd–Frank Act.17 Layer onto that
the studies required under §§ 106, 402, and 504 of the recently enacted
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act18 and the report required
under Section 7 of the Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge
(STOCK) Act19. . . . “Study fatigue” (if there is such a thing), in
addition to general regulatory overload (including in connection with
other provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, the JOBS Act, and the STOCK
Act), seemed probable.
In sum, I determined that the SEC has exhibited a desire to engage in
honest reform, despite its overall conservatism. Yet, underfunding,
congressional meddling, and study fatigue present real barriers to
success. Beyond these observations on the SEC’s reform efforts,
however, I remained somewhat at a loss as to how to approach the
question of Section 967’s utility as an agency reform tool in the short
term and long term, especially given recent changes in the leadership of
the SEC occasioned by former Chairman Schapiro’s resignation
effective in December 2012 (resulting in Elisse Walter assuming the
position of Chairman) 20 and President Obama’s subsequent nomination
16. Heminway, supra note 5.
17. The National Economic Research Associates, Inc. has produced a chart showing sixteen SEC
studies provided for in Dodd–Frank and their relevant deadlines. NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASS’N,
ECON. CONSULTING, STUDIES—SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (2012), available at
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/Securities_and_Exchange_Commission.pdf. A summary provided by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness lists twenty-four SEC
studies. CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010: SUMMARY OF
RULEMAKING, STUDIES, AND CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS BY TITLE,
available
at
http://chamberpost.typepad.com/files/dodd-frank-summary-sheet.pdf. A leading law firm catalogues
eighteen SEC studies. DAVIS POLK, DODD–FRANK PROGRESS REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG//July2011_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf.
18. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 102, 402, 504, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
19. Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105,
§ 7, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
20. See Paul Davidson & Tim Mullaney, Elisse Walter Tapped to Lead SEC; Mary Schapiro
TODAY
(Nov.
27,
2012),
Leaving,
U.S.A.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2012/11/26/mary-schapiro-sec-leaving/1726837/; Ben
Protess & Susanne Craig, Rebuilding Wall Street’s Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 26, 2012,
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and the U.S. Senate’s confirmation of Mary Jo White as Chairman.21 I
knew that what I was searching for was in the nature of an assessment
tool. What I needed was a rubric for the evaluation of Section 967 and
the SEC’s related program of reform. My prior work incorporating the
literature of change leadership and change management was not up to
this task. That literature identifies attributes of people and processes
that predict a likelihood of success in reform efforts; it does not measure
the efficacy of reform efforts.
By (as I have done before) reaching outside the law, I have been able
to acquire some additional insight (even if not the simple rubric I
sought). Social scientists have developed and contribute to a field of
study—program evaluation—that holds promise in resolving questions
about the propriety and potential success of institutional reforms at the
SEC, including those under Section 967. This field encourages the
thorough, systematized assessment of the programs, agendas, and plans
of various types of organizations.
Program evaluation in the
governmental agency realm interfaces with public administration,
including agency reform efforts.22 The mandates of Section 967 may
exemplify good program evaluation in federal government. If they do,
there is reason to believe that Section 967 may be worth the paper on
which it is written and worthy of the SEC’s continued attention as it
continues down a reform-oriented path.
In Part I of this Article, I describe what I have learned about the
general contours of program evaluation and its application in the context
of administrative reform efforts, in each case based on existing program
evaluation and public administration literature. I then briefly link this
overview back to my earlier work on change leadership at the SEC. In
Part II, I provide an assessment of the content and implementation of
Section 967 through the lens of program evaluation. This assessment
provides a general framework for making limited observations about the
efficacy of Section 967 and the overall nature of evaluating reform
efforts at the SEC. The conclusion in Part III summarizes the key
observations made in Part II and comments generally on the prospects
for continued SEC reform and the need for consistent SEC program
evaluation and, therefore, enhanced congressional consideration of and
10:15 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/schapiro-head-of-s-e-c-to-announce-departure/.
21. See Dina ElBoghdady, Mary Jo White confirmed as SEC Chief, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-08/business/38373590_1_mary-jo-white-al-franken-creditrating-agency-industry.
22. See Mari Millery, Planning for a Service Program Evaluation, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
PROGRAM EVALUATION PLANNING 63, 71 (Debra J. Holden & Marc A. Zimmerman eds., 2009)
[hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE] (“Many service programs have instituted quality assurance or
continuous quality improvement programs that intersect, and sometimes overlap, with program
evaluation efforts in general and process evaluation efforts in particular.”).
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responsibility for the program evaluations it sponsors.
I. PROGRAM EVALUATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE MANAGEMENT
Program evaluation is a type of assessment process that has become
standard in organizational management. “Program evaluation is
essential to demonstrate effective practice, advance an organization’s
mission, and powerfully respond to one’s internal and external
stakeholders.”23 Although the literature on program evaluation is most
commonly applied to the assessment of social programs (especially
human service programs), it also has been applied to the review of
business plans and strategies, educational programs, and government
administrative activities. This Part briefly describes program evaluation
both generally and in the administrative reform context.
A. Defining Program Evaluation
Program evaluation is a rigorous, planned, approach to assessing the
efficacy of an organization or organizational activity.
More
formalistically, one might describe program evaluation as “a social
science activity directed at collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and
communicating information about the workings and effectiveness
of . . . programs.”24 As such, it represents an important, practical
analytical tool in organizational and managerial studies.
Program evaluation is applied research used as part of the managerial
process. Evaluations are conducted to aid those who must make
administrative decisions about . . . programs. Unlike theoretical research,
where scientists engage in science for its own sake, program evaluation
systematically examines . . . programs for pragmatic reasons. Decision
makers may need to know if a program accomplished its objectives, if it
is worth funding again next year, or if a less expensive program can
accomplish the same results.25

Program evaluation may occur at the behest of an internal constituent of
the organization that conducts or operates the program or as required or
suggested by someone from outside the organization. The person who
23. STEPHEN A. KAPP & GARY R. ANDERSON, AGENCY-BASED PROGRAM EVALUATION:
LESSONS FROM PRACTICE 1 (2010).
24. PETER H. ROSSI ET AL., EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 2 (7th ed. 2003). The
authors of this text also offer a slightly different, but consonant definition that is useful. “Program
evaluation is the use of social research methods to systematically investigate the effectiveness
of . . . programs in ways that are adapted to their political and organizational environments and are
designed to inform . . . action . . . .” Id. at 16.
25. DAVID ROYSE ET AL., PROGRAM EVALUATION: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (4th ed. 2006).
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requests the assessment is known as the “evaluation sponsor.”26 The
process of program evaluation is founded on a series of questions
developed by the evaluation sponsor and others with interest in the
program being evaluated, in consultation with the evaluator.27 The
process of developing and refining these evaluation questions may
involve both clarifying the various objectives of the constituent
stakeholders and negotiating among those constituents to reach common
ground.28 This development and refinement process typically involves
inquiries into the motivation for raising the evaluation questions.29
Although the evaluation questions are the impetus and foundation for
the program evaluation, the overall process of program evaluation, like
that of traditional academic research methodologies, involves planning,
data collection, analysis, and reporting.30 As a result, the program
evaluation process is characterized by a series of general, sequential
steps. One text summarizes these steps in an eight-part framework that
comprises:
 Identifying the evaluation question;
 Conceptualizing the evaluation question;
 Operationalizing the evaluation question;
 Selecting and defining the evaluation method;
 Selecting the sample for evaluation;
 Collecting data;
 Managing and analyze data; and
 Employing the resulting information operationally.31
Even though it is not apparent from this list of sequenced steps, the
program evaluation process involves ongoing consultation among the
26. Id. at 18 (“The evaluation plan is generally organized around the questions posed about the
program by those who commission the evaluation, called the evaluation sponsor, and other pertinent
stakeholders—individuals, groups, or organizations that have a significant interest in how well a
program functions.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
[O]ften, . . . the evaluator must negotiate with the evaluation sponsors and stakeholders
to develop and refine the questions. Although these parties presumably know their own
interests and purposes, they will not necessarily formulate their concerns in ways that the
evaluator can use to structure an evaluation plan. For instance, the initial questions may
be vague, overly general, or phrased in program jargon that must be translated for more
general consumption . . . . In such cases, the evaluator must probe thoroughly to
determine what the question means to the evaluation sponsor and program stakeholders
and why they are concerned about it.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
29. Id. (“Equally important are the reasons the questions about the program are being asked,
especially the uses that will be made of the answers.”).
30. Id. at 16 (“[E]valuators will typically employ social research procedures for gathering,
analyzing, and interpreting evidence about the performance of a program.”).
31. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 27.
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evaluators and, more often than not, between the evaluators and various
stakeholders. Another program evaluation text makes this part of the
process explicit by expressly incorporating stakeholder engagement in
its distinctive articulation of the first five (pre-investigative) steps in the
program evaluation process.32 Various frameworks for evaluation
planning exist, and formal, specialized program evaluation methods and
rubrics have been constructed for the review of specific types of
programs (e.g., educational, public health, and human service).33
These tailored methods and rubrics reflect an important reality of
program evaluation: the purpose and nature of the evaluation process is
different from program to program and context to context.34 “One of the
most challenging aspects of program evaluation is that there is no ‘one
size fits all’ approach.”35
As a practical matter, an evaluation must . . . be tailored to the
organizational makeup of the program. In designing the evaluation, the
evaluator must take into account any number of organizational factors,
such as the availability of administrative cooperation and support; the
ways in which program files and data are kept and access permitted to
them; the character of the services provided; and the nature, frequency,
duration, and location of the contact between the program and its
clients.36

Moreover, program evaluation plans are not static. Typically, they
are highly contextual and require revision and refinement as the
evaluation proceeds.37 The context in which a program evaluation
32. PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 1–2 (setting forth the five steps in the Evaluation
Planning Incorporating Context (EPIC) model: “(1) assess context, (2) gather reconnaissance, (3)
engage stakeholders, (4) describe the program, and (5) focus the evaluation.”); see also Debra J. Holden
& Marc A. Zimmerman, Program Evaluation Planning: Overview and Analysis, in PRACTICAL GUIDE,
supra note 22, 143, 145–51[hereinafter Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis] (summarizing and
commenting on the five steps in the EPIC model).
33. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM
EVALUATION (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/eval/framework/index.htm; Julie A. Marshall,
Planning for an Education Evaluation, in PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 33–61; Millery, supra
note 22, at 63–85; Fatma Mizikaci, A Systems Approach to Program Evaluation Model for Quality in
Higher Education, 14 QUALITY ASSURANCE IN EDUC. 37 (2006), available at
http://www.ftsm.ukm.my/aishah/paper%20pdf_2nd%20education/Fatma_A%20systems%20approach%
20to%20program%20evaluation%20model%20for%20quality%20in%20higher%20education.pdf.
34. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 2 (“Evaluations are conducted for a variety of practical
reasons: to aid in decisions concerning whether programs should be continued, improved, expanded, or
curtailed; to assess the utility of new programs and initiatives; to increase the effectiveness of program
management and administration; and to satisfy the accountability requirements of program sponsors.”);
see also ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 12–13 (summarizing four reasons for program evaluation).
35. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 32.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. (“[O]nce an evaluation is launched, it is common for changes and ‘in-flight’ corrections
to be required. Modifications, perhaps even compromises, may be necessary in the types, quantity, or
quality of the data collected as a result of unanticipated practical or political obstacles, changes in the
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occurs may involve, for example, the overall ethical, political,
economic, cultural, or social environment surrounding the program
evaluation, the program’s activities, or the markets in which the program
operates or the program’s activities are conducted, as well as resource or
funding and operating concerns relating to the program.38 Program
resource and funding issues may have particular salience in evaluation
planning in difficult financial times because program evaluation may
help decision makers identify where to focus or reallocate limited
resources or when to cut ineffectual programs.39 “The ability to
articulate the value of one’s interventions and programs and satisfy
constituents becomes heightened when facing times of economic stress,
difficult funding decisions, and an increased demand for services.”40
B. Evaluation of Governmental Reform Programs
Human service programs have been the focal point of program
evaluation, but program evaluation has applications that extend far and
wide—across for-profit, not-for-profit, and governmental organizations.
To be sure, program evaluation processes “are useful in virtually all
spheres of activity in which issues are raised about the effectiveness of
organized social action . . . . Administrators in both the public and
private sectors often assess the managerial, fiscal, and personnel
practices of their organizations.”41 In fact, it can safely be said that, in
certain governmental administrative settings, program evaluation has
become a regular part of the ordinary course business of government.
Evaluation has now become a political and managerial activity that makes
operation of the program, or shifts in the interest of the stakeholders.”). In sum:
Program evaluation is not a cut-and-dried activity like putting up a prefabricated house
or checking a document with a word processor’s spelling program. Rather, evaluators
must tailor the initial evaluation plan to the particular program and its circumstances and
then typically revise and modify their plan as needed. The specific form and scope of an
evaluation depend primarily on its purposes and audience, the nature of the program
being evaluated, and, not least, the political and organizational context within which the
evaluation is conducted.
Id. at 18.
38. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 1; see also ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 41–44
(identifying “administrative and political context” as a factor to be taken into account in conducting a
program evaluation).
39. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 15. Specifically, one group of scholar-commentators
contends:
Regardless of political trends, two points seem clear about the current environment for
evaluation. First, restraints on resources will continue to require funders to choose
the . . . problem areas on which to concentrate.
Id.
40. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 1.
41. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 6.
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significant input into the complex mosaic from which emerge policy
decisions and resources for starting, enlarging, changing, or sustaining
programs to better the human condition. In this regard, evaluation
research must be seen as an integral part of the social policy and public
administration movements.42

The use of program evaluation in assessing federal government
programs is not new. “Since at least the 1960s, program evaluation and
its close companion, policy analysis, have become institutionalized
aspects of congressional oversight and agency management of federal
programs.” 43 Examples exist in many contexts, from the general to the
very specific.
The broad scope of program evaluation can be seen in the evaluations of
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which have covered the
procurement and testing of military hardware, quality control for drinking
water, the maintenance of major highways, the use of hormones to
stimulate growth in beef cattle, and other organized activities far afield
from human services.44

Research undertaken in connection with this Article revealed an
unsuccessful congressional attempt to legislate a federal government
program evaluation commission.45
Notwithstanding this history, questions remain about the relevance
and appropriateness of applying program evaluation to governmental
administrative reform projects in the federal agency setting. For
example, can financial regulatory initiatives like those pursued at the
SEC be successful subjects of program evaluation? They are not

42. Id. at 10–11.
43. ROSALIE RUEGG & IRWIN FELLER, A TOOLKIT FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC R&D INVESTMENT:
MODELS, METHODS, AND FINDINGS FROM ATP’S FIRST DECADE 1 (2003), available at
http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr03-857/contents.htm; see also ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 12–14
(“Evaluation activities increased rapidly during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies of the 1960s,
when social programs undertaken under the banners of the War on Poverty and the Great Society
provided extensive resources”); see also ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 11–15 (describing program
evaluation at the intersection of social policy and public administration).
44. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. The GAO (referenced in the text accompanying this note
44) is guided in its evaluation efforts by Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
(GAGAS), set forth in the so-called “Yellow Book,” that govern both financial and performance audits.
See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS: 2011 INTERNET
VERSION 13 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter YELLOW BOOK], http://www.gao.gov/govaud/iv2011gagas.pdf;
Arthur B. Laby, Implementing Regulatory Harmonization at the SEC, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 189,
200 (2010–11). “Performance audits provide objective analysis to assist management and those charged
with governance and oversight in using the information to improve program performance and
operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate
corrective action, and contribute to public accountability.” YELLOW BOOK, supra, at 13. The GAO’s
performance audit standards may provide helpful guidance to external program evaluators.
45. H.R.
5588,
106th
Congress
(2000),
available
at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr5588/text.
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apparently “social programs,” which have historically been the focus of
program evaluation,46 but they are seemingly “programs” in the context
of GAO performance audits.47
Even if we assume that substantive financial regulatory initiatives can
be assessed productively through program evaluation, institutional
transformation programs may not be appropriate candidates for program
evaluation. Are the reform efforts of administrative agencies properly
classified as “programs” for program evaluation purposes? “[P]rograms
can be vague and hard to distinguish and define.”48 In the program
evaluation context, a program is defined to include “an organized
collection of activities designed to reach certain objectives.”49 Although
a program typically requires its own staffing, has its own budget, and
has its own identity within a given organizational structure, a program
may be best defined as a collection of activities that has an identifiable,
ongoing existence and a quantifiable, recognized influence or
outcome.50
By these measures, a sufficiently defined plan of
administrative reform with specific measurable objectives may be
classified as a “program” suitable for program evaluation.51
Program evaluation in the agency reform context can be properly
construed as an adjunct to a managerial approach to public sector
administrative reform. Sometimes characterized as “New Public
Management” (NPM), managerialist administrative reform is top-driven
reform that incorporates structural and process modifications with the
objective of achieving change in public sector units.52
New Public Management—more generally known as “managerialism”—
has been defined so often by so many observers that it has become
conceptually incoherent. Properly understood, NPM’s focal emphasis is
on reducing or eliminating structural distinctions between the public and
private sectors so that the behavior of public managers resembles that of
managers in entrepreneurial, profit-driven, investor-owned firms.53
46. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 29 (defining “social program; social intervention” as
“[a]n organized, planned, and usually ongoing effort designed to ameliorate a social problem or improve
social conditions.”).
47. See YELLOW BOOK, supra note 44, at 13 (“The term ‘program’ is used in GAGAS to include
government entities, organizations, programs, activities, and functions.”).
48. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 5–7.
51. For example, the SEC has established a Web page collecting and identifying its “PostMadoff Reforms.” See The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2013). It is unclear that this listing, taken alone, is sufficient to evidence a program.
52. See Brendan C. Nolan, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE xix, xx–
xxi (Brendan C. Nolan ed. 2001).
53. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Sydney Stein, Jr., New Public Management Comes to America 1
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Thus, although its definition in the abstract may be unclear, in
practice, NPM describes an approach to public administration founded
on a series of core, outcome-driven principles co-opted from private
enterprise. “NPM, like most administrative labels, is a loose term. Its
usefulness lies in its convenience as a shorthand name for the set of
broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the
bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD group of countries
from the late 1970s.”54 Specifically, Professor Christopher Hood asserts
that New Public Management comprises seven doctrines:








“‘Hands-on professional management’ in the public sector”;55
“Explicit standards and measures of performance”;56
“Greater emphasis on output controls”;57
“Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector”;58
“Shift to greater competition in the public sector”;59
“Stress on private-sector styles of management practice”;60 and
“Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.”61

These seven doctrines are rooted in a perceived need for accountability
and are driven by a desire for the attainment of measurable results and
operating efficiencies.62
Given that NPM derives its strength from confidence in private
enterprise management, one might expect that management failures in
the private sector would deter the use of NPM. Certainly, the Enron
debacle, Martha Stewart’s legal troubles, the Bernie Madoff affair, and
(most recently) the subprime mortgage market collapse could have been
enough to discourage the use of private enterprise as a model for just
about anything. Although faith in business managers and free markets
has suffered in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, it seems that many

(Harris
School
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
08.04,
2006),
available
at
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/working-papers/wp_08_04.pdf.
54. Christopher Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons, 69 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3–4 (1991).
55. Id. at 4 (“Active, visible, discretionary control of organizations from named persons at the
top, ‘free to manage’”).
56. Id. (“Definition of goals, targets, indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative
terms, especially for professional services”).
57. Id. (“Resource allocation and rewards linked to measured performance; breakup of
centralized bureaucracy-wide personnel management”).
58. Id. at 5 (“Break up of formerly ‘monolithic’ units, unbundling of U-form management
systems into corporatized units around products, operating on decentralized ‘one-line’ budgets and
dealing with one another on an ‘arms-length’ basis”).
59. Id. (“Move to term contracts and public tendering procedures”).
60. Id. (“Move away from military-style ‘public service ethic’, greater flexibility in hiring and
rewards; greater use of PR techniques”).
61. Id. (“Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands, limiting
‘compliance costs’ to business”).
62. Id. at 4–5.
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of the doctrines have survived intact, and government reform efforts
continue to rely on the values underlying NPM—albeit in a refocused
form.63 To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of NPM64 are
greatly exaggerated.65
The reform efforts with which the SEC has been engaged since early
2009 are consistent with NPM. A number of Professor Hood’s seven
doctrines are evidenced in those efforts. For example, based on public
reports, the actions of the SEC’s former Chairman, Mary Schapiro, and
the SEC’s former Director of the Division of Enforcement, Robert
Khuzami, in leading change at the SEC exemplify engaged, “hands-on
professional management,” the first doctrine.66 Also, the reorganization
of the Division of Enforcement under the leadership of former Chairman
Schapiro and former Director Khuzami was designed to focus on the
operations of the division and eliminate bureaucratic waste, emphasizing
“output controls” and disaggregating operating units consistent with the
third and fourth doctrines.67 And finally, the overall employment of
change leadership strategies and processes derived from studies of
private business transitions is evidence of a focus on “private sector
styles of management practice,” the sixth doctrine.68
Based on these collected observations, program evaluation, as a
63. See Roger Levy, New Public Management: End of an Era?, 25 PUB. POLICY & ADMIN. 234
(2010).
64. See Patrick Dunleavy et al., New Public Management Is Dead—Long Live Digital-Era
Governance, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 467, 468 (2006) (“The intellectually and practically
dominant set of managerial and governance ideas of the last two decades, new public management
(NPM), has essentially died in the water.”).
65. See W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE YEAR THAT DEFINED AMERICAN JOURNALISM: 1897 AND
THE CLASH OF PARADIGMS 79 (2006). The actual quote is: “The report of my death was an
exaggeration.” See id.; W. Joseph Campbell, Noting the Anniversary of Twain’s ‘Report of My Death’
Comment,
MEDIA
MYTH
ALERT
(June
1,
2011,
7:02
AM),
http://mediamythalert.wordpress.com/2011/06/01/noting-the-anniversary-of-twains-report-of-my-deathcomment/. Although Mark Twain is known to have commented along these lines more than once, the
earliest example is in a note reportedly written by him in May 1897 relating to an extrapolation of his
illness and death from the illness of his cousin. Barbara Schmidt, Directory of Mark Twain’s maxims,
quotations, and various opinions: DEATH, TWAIN QUOTES, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
66. See supra text accompanying note 55 (labeling and describing the first doctrine); Heminway,
Reframing, supra note 6, at 637–41 (identifying various aspects of hands-on professional management
in assessing then Chairman Schapiro and then Director Khuzami as wartime leaders and problem
finders).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 57 & 58 (labeling and describing the third and fourth
doctrines); Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at
News Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm) (describing the
reorganization of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement).
68. See supra text accompanying note 60 (labeling and describing the sixth doctrine);
Heminway, Reframing, supra note 6 (analyzing SEC reform efforts through the lens of change
leadership literature); Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6 (same).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/3

14

Heminway: Desire, Conservatism, Underfunding, Congressional Meddling, and S

2012]

ONGOING REFORM AT THE SEC?

457

process, has the potential to make government operations and change
management more accountable and responsive. As such, it has the
capacity to be an integral part of NPM efforts and to be used to assess
the efficacy of agency programs, including reform projects built on
NPM doctrines and change management efforts more generally.
Misgivings about a managerialist approach to public administration
arising out of perceived and actual corporate mismanagement and
agency failures preceding and contributing to the recent financial crisis
can be displaced or resolved through effective program evaluation.
Congressional passage of Section 967 may have had this purpose or may
have this effect. In addition, congressional qualms about the nature and
effects of the SEC’s internal reform efforts may be reinforced or laid to
rest by an external assessment built on tested social science principles
and methodologies. Section 967, as an example of program evaluation,
may evidence a positive contribution to public administration and
change management. Query whether this potential has been achieved in
implementation . . . . Part II offers preliminary observations on the
success of the program evaluation actually undertaken under Section
967 with the thought that these observations may instruct Congress in its
future program evaluation efforts.
II. EVALUATING SEC OPERATIONS AND REFORM UNDER SECTION 967
The information in Part I indicates that program evaluation may be
useful in assessing SEC operations, including potentially the SEC’s
current reform program. Section 967 calls for an assessment process
that looks like program evaluation.69 But is the study required under
Section 967 efficacious? Does the congressional mandate in Section
967 set into motion a useful, constructive process of program
evaluation? Was the process carried out in a manner that appears
consistent with quality program evaluation practices? And does the
outcome and implementation of the process appear to be appropriate and
positive?
Even without expertise in social science research
methodologies or public administration, a reader of the literature on
program evaluation can make a number of relevant observations in
response to these questions.
A. The Overall Congressional Approach Under Section 967
As the evaluation sponsor, Congress motivates the program

69. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 967(a)(1)–(2), 967(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010);
supra text accompanying notes 2 & 3.
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evaluation required by Section 967. Accordingly, Congress must
establish the scope of the evaluation, framing its focus and contents and
isolating, or helping to isolate, the question or questions to be answered
through the evaluation process. These decisions are made in the context
of Congress’s control over the SEC’s existence and authority (given that
it and the regulatory system it monitors are congressionally created),70 as
well as its control over funding.71 And they are made in light of
perceived or potential failures at the SEC—problems in the execution of
its congressional mandate.
[P]rogram evaluation often begins by identifying a problem. Decision
makers want to distinguish programs that work from those that do not and
to know if their money is well spent. They may have developed
questions about a program because of some incident or problems brought
to their attention . . . . A problem is any undesirable situation or
condition. Sometimes program evaluations are undertaken in order to
determine the extent or magnitude of a problem or to confirm a suspected
problem . . . .72

How well did Congress do in its role as evaluation sponsor? Did it
adequately establish a framework for the program evaluation it
requested in Section 967?
Congress framed the matters it wanted studied in some detail in the
statute. Section 967 first references generally an examination of “the
internal operations, structure, funding, and the need for comprehensive
reform of the SEC, as well as the SEC’s relationship with and reliance
on self-regulatory organizations and other entities relevant to the
regulation of securities and the protection of securities investors that are
under the SEC’s oversight.”73 If I understand this general aspect of
Congress’s program evaluation directive correctly, it translates into
several possible evaluation questions74 with overlapping areas of focus.
One possible phrasing of these questions follows.


Are the internal operations, structure, and funding of the SEC

70. See 15 U.S.C. §78d (2006) (establishing the SEC); see also Heminway, Sustaining, supra
note 6, at 9–11 (describing congressional funding authority over the SEC and its effects on SEC
operations); James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-itseffectiveness.html?pagewanted=all.
71. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 20 (“[A]n evaluation may be conducted because it is
mandated by program funders and then used only to demonstrate compliance with that requirement.”).
72. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 15.
73. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1).
74. See supra text accompanying note 31 (noting that the first step of the program evaluation
process is to identify the evaluation question); KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 26 (“Identify the
evaluation question is the part of the process where the general focus of the project is stated in the form
of a research question.”) (emphasis added).
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appropriate, effective, efficient, and sufficient based on the
SEC’s current mandate?
Is there a need for comprehensive reform of the SEC in order for
it to successfully execute its mission and fulfill its
responsibilities?
Are the SEC’s relationship with and reliance on self-regulatory
organizations and other securities regulation and investor
protection entities under SEC oversight properly suited to its
functions?

The first of these possible research questions is broad enough to
encompass the other two. The second of these possible questions hones
in directly on the SEC’s ongoing and prospective future reform efforts
and, by focusing on the word “comprehensive,” seems to indicate that
Congress is seeking information about whether those reforms ought to
be more foundational or all-encompassing than they currently are. The
third of these possible questions identifies a specific aspect of the SEC’s
current operations, stemming from the overall structure of federal
securities regulation—the interactions between the SEC and other
regulatory organizations in the federal regulatory system over which the
SEC has monitoring, rule-making, enforcement, and other
responsibilities. This broadly worded question indicates a macro-level
concern about the position and authority of the SEC in the federal
system of securities regulation. It seems reasonable, in a program
evaluation context, to view the second and third possible research
questions as additional information about the nature of the desired
inquiry that helps the evaluator conceptualize the principal evaluation
question.75
Section 967 also sets forth more specifically the minimum required
focuses of the mandated study. Congress required that the study
address:
(A) the possible elimination of unnecessary or redundant units at the
SEC;
(B) improving communications between SEC offices and divisions;
(C) the need to put in place a clear chain-of-command structure,
particularly for enforcement examinations and compliance inspections;
(D) the effect of high-frequency trading and other technological advances
on the market and what the SEC requires to monitor the effect of such
trading and advances on the market;

75. See supra text accompanying note 31 (noting that the second step of the program evaluation
process is to conceptualize the question); KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 26 (“Conceptualize the
question puts greater detail around the question. This step clarifies the key concepts in the evaluation
question.”) (emphasis added).
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(E) the SEC’s hiring authorities, workplace policies, and personal
practices, including—
(i) whether there is a need to further streamline hiring authorities for
those who are not lawyers, accountants, compliance examiners, or
economists;
(ii) whether there is a need for further pay reforms;
(iii) the diversity of skill sets of SEC employees and whether the
present skill set diversity efficiently and effectively fosters the SEC’s
mission of investor protection; and
(iv) the application of civil service laws by the SEC;
(F) whether the SEC’s oversight and reliance on self-regulatory
organizations promotes efficient and effective governance for the
securities markets; and
(G) whether adjusting the SEC’s reliance on self-regulatory organizations
is necessary to promote more efficient and effective governance for the
securities markets.76

This list identifies more specific congressional concerns about the
SEC and its existing regulatory and reform activities and, as a result,
offers the evaluator additional information on the objectives of the
required study, enabling a further conceptualization of the evaluation
question or questions. However, some of the specified areas of concern
are vaguer than others. A number of the listed items identify a potential
problem but fail to put that problem in a sufficiently detailed context.
For example, Congress is concerned about “communications between
SEC offices and divisions.”77 In what respect? For what reasons?
Similarly, Congress expresses a concern in Section 967 with the clarity
of the SEC’s “chain-of-command structure, particularly for enforcement
examinations and compliance inspections.”78 But Congress does not
identify what is unclear about the current chain-of-command structure or
why it is concerned about this lack of clarity. Congress also fails to
indicate the apparently unique issues relating to the chain of command
in the Division of Enforcement that caused it to call that division out for
special treatment in Section 967. Without this additional contextual
information, it will be difficult for a program evaluator to operationalize
the evaluation question or questions and design the evaluation process—
selecting and delineating the methodology and choosing the sample to
be studied.79
76. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(2).
77. Id. § 967(a)(2)(B).
78. Id. § 967(a)(2)(C).
79. See supra text accompanying note 31 (noting that the third, fourth, and fifth steps of the
program evaluation process involve operationalizing the evaluation question, selecting and defining the
evaluation method, and selecting the sample for evaluation); KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 26–
27 (“Operationalize the question adds further detail to the question . . . . This step defines specific
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In operationalizing the evaluation questions and designing the
evaluation process, one key concern is determining the type of
evaluation to be conducted. The literature on program evaluation
generally defines two principal types of program evaluation. An
evaluation may be summative (effectiveness-oriented or impactoriented) or formative (process-oriented).80 A summative evaluation is
designed to assess a program’s effectiveness.81 A formative evaluation
focuses on assessing program implementation and improving the
program.82
The guidance given by the U.S. Congress in Section 967 may lend
itself to both types of evaluation. For example, Congress’s inquiries
about “whether the SEC’s oversight and reliance on self regulatory
organizations promotes efficient and effective governance for the
securities markets”83 and “whether adjusting the SEC’s reliance on selfregulatory organizations is necessary to promote more efficient and
effective governance for the securities markets”84 appear to require
summative evaluations and outcomes. In contrast, the congressional
directives to study “the possible elimination of unnecessary or redundant
units at the SEC,”85 “improving communications between SEC offices

concepts of the evaluation question . . . . These initial steps [the first three steps in the evaluation
process] set up the choice of the actual design by putting some detail around the intended question.”).
80. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 28–29; BLAINE R. WORTHEN ET AL., PROGRAM
EVALUATION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND PRACTICAL GUIDELINES 14–18 (2nd ed. 1997). The
summative versus formative distinction can be conceptualized as a characterization of the measurement
of evaluation outcomes. See Debra J. Holden & Marc A. Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning Here and
Now, in PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 24 [hereinafter Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation
Planning] (characterizing summative outcomes as intermediate-term/effectiveness/impact outcomes and
formative outcomes as short-term or process-oriented outcomes).
81. Id. at 29 (“[A] summative evaluation . . . is focused on assessing the effectiveness of the
program.”); see also Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that
summative outcomes “are typically related to behavior or policy change, with a focus on the direct or
indirect effects of the program on participants, as well as larger systems and possibly the community.”);
ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 175 (“Summative program evaluation studies are those that provide an
empirically based appraisal of the results, or final outcomes, of an innovative program.”); WORTHEN ET
AL., supra note 80, at 14 (“Summative evaluation is conducted and made public to provide program
decision makers and potential consumers with judgments about that program’s worth or merit in
relation to important criteria.”) (emphasis omitted).
82. Id. at 28 (noting that a process evaluation is “designed to improve the program”); ROYSE ET
AL., supra note 25, at 116 (“Formative evaluations are employed to adjust and enhance interventions.
They are not used to prove whether a program is worth the funding it receives but serve more to guide
and direct programs . . . .”); WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 14 (“Formative evaluation is conducted
to provide program staff evaluative information useful in improving the program.”) (emphasis omitted);
Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 24 (describing formative measures as
focused “on the process of program implementation.”).
83. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(2)(F).
84. Id. § 967(a)(2)(G).
85. Id. § 967(a)(2)(A).
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and divisions,”86 and “the need to put in place a clear chain-of-command
structure, particularly for enforcement examinations and compliance
inspections”87 seem to be directed toward process-oriented formative
evaluation. Congressional clarification on these judgments would be
helpful to the program evaluator. Presumably, this is an area in which
ongoing consultation should be undertaken between the evaluation
sponsor and the evaluator,88 but this is a difficult task when Congress, a
large and diverse legislative body (comprising two houses), is the
evaluation sponsor.
A program evaluation also may assess outputs or effects on one or
more levels depending on the perspectives of the constituencies to be
served by the program and the evaluation process.
Level refers to the focus of the evaluation in terms of whether the findings
of greatest interest are at the individual level (i.e., the people served by
the program), community or local level, state or regional level, or national
level. Each level of evaluation will have different contexts that the
evaluator needs to understand thoroughly to effectively plan the
evaluation. The differing levels, for example, will influence the selection
of stakeholders to engage in the evaluation planning process and the
questions that will be of the greatest importance to the sponsor.89

Because the level or levels of a particular program evaluation are
based on the desired outcomes of the evaluation process,90 they
necessarily reflect the nature of the evaluation questions and the type of
program evaluation (summative or formative) being conducted. The
program evaluator determines the level or levels of the evaluation in
planning the evaluation. “The purpose of the evaluation and the
outcomes of interest to the sponsor drive the level or focus of the
evaluation.”91
The program evaluation required by Section 967 manifests as a multileveled process, and the BCG Report indicates it was conducted at
several levels.92 The study areas that appear to require summative
evaluation93 may involve analyses conducted at the level of the
86. Id. § 967(a)(2)(B).
87. Id. § 967(a)(2)(C).
88. See supra note 28.
89. Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 2–3; see also Holden &
Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 15 (“‘Level’ of evaluation is a fairly complex
concept that refers to the perspective of greatest importance to be measured through the evaluation.”).
90. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 15.
91. Id.; see also Millery, supra note 22, at 70 (“Determining the level of evaluation is parallel to
clarifying the purpose of the evaluation.”).
92. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 5 (“BCG . . . conducted more than 425 discussions with the
SEC, former SEC officials, regulated entities, peer regulators, SROs, and industry groups.”).
93. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(2)(F)–(G); supra text accompanying notes 83 & 84.
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regulatory subjects—participants in the securities markets (e.g., buyers,
sellers, and intermediaries)—as well as at the level of co-regulators on a
national level and Congress as the funding institution. The evaluation
levels of other study areas, including those that may involve more
formative evaluation,94 are significantly harder to gauge without more
contextual information. In some cases, it is hard to gauge from the
statutory provision alone what the purpose of the evaluation is and what
outcomes may be of the most interest to Congress.95 As with the types
of evaluation, the statute alone does not unambiguously provide
sufficient information to permit the evaluator to definitively designate
the levels of evaluation required or desirable. Consultation between the
evaluator and Congress would help clarify the evaluation levels,96 but it
is, as earlier noted, impractical.
The evaluation question or questions, in the context of information
about the program itself, assist the evaluator in at least preliminarily
assessing the type and level of evaluation to be made.97 As a result, a
lack of clarity in evaluation questions may result in suboptimal decisions
concerning the design and implementation of the evaluation process. In
Section 967, the U.S. Congress has provided the SEC and the evaluator
important baseline information about the matters to be included in the
study. However, in some cases, uncertainties about the context in which
these matters should be studied and the objectives or outcomes desired
by Congress in requesting the study of those matters may, without more
congressional guidance, present challenges in the evaluation process.
Although it is common in a program evaluation process for an evaluator
and sponsor to consult on an ongoing basis about these kinds of
uncertainties, Congress is a large, decentralized, deliberative institution,
making consultation difficult (if not impossible), and no consultative
process is expressly included in Section 967. If Congress desires to
mandate program evaluations through the legislative process, it should
develop or otherwise acquire enough expertise in program evaluation to
be able to frame precise evaluation questions that best ensure an
efficient, effective evaluation process and consider establishing a
process for consultation in the event that questions arise.

94. See, e.g., id. § 937 (a)(2)(A)–(C); supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
95. See supra text accompanying note 91.
96. See supra note 28.
97. But cf. Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 10 (“The evaluator
needs to plan and conduct the study in the context of the program’s people, politics, history, resources,
constraints, values, needs, and interests.”). Adjustments in the evaluation questions and the type and
level of evaluation may be made over the course of the program evaluation. See KAPP & ANDERSON,
supra note 23, at 28–29.
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B. The Engagement and Involvement of BCG
Under Section 967, the SEC was required to “hire an independent
consultant of high caliber and with expertise in organizational
restructuring and the operations of capital markets . . . .”98 In response
to this congressional directive, the SEC retained The Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) to perform the required study. The BCG Report
summarizes the findings of the study conducted by BCG in accordance
with that engagement. This part of the Article offers observations on the
retention of BCG, the assessment activities of BCG, and the BCG
Report from the perspective of program evaluation literature. The
purpose of this assessment is to identify and evaluate issues associated
with the retention, monitoring, and requested outputs of external
evaluators as a case study. Thus case study may offer information
useful to future program evaluations initiated by congressional action.
1. BCG as an External Evaluator Hired by the SEC
Program evaluations may be conducted with an evaluator internal to
the program or with an external evaluator.99 External evaluations may
be conducted by (among others) university researchers or private
consultants.100 The choice of internal or external evaluation may have
advantages and disadvantages based on context.101
The use of an external evaluator—an independent expert consultant,
as mandated by Section 967—has several identifiable potential
advantages in this context. These possible advantages include (as the
term “independent expert consultant” suggests) offering a more
objective evaluation and taking advantage of relevant, and possibly
broad-based, program evaluation expertise. However, using an external
evaluator also may result in a more efficient and effective evaluation
process (helping to avert undue mission-distraction for the agency) and
may better ensure timeliness in meeting sponsor-dictated deadlines for
completion of the review process. An interesting aspect of the study
required under Section 967 that may counterbalance some of these
advantages is the separation of program evaluation sponsorship (which
rests in Congress) from program evaluation funding (which was
supplied under Section 967 by the SEC). Each of these aspects of
program evaluation in the context of Section 967 is addressed in turn in

98. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1).
99. See WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 18 (“The adjectives internal and external distinguish
between evaluations conducted by program employees and those conducted by outsiders.”).
100. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 89–100.
101. See id.; WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 18–19.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/3

22

Heminway: Desire, Conservatism, Underfunding, Congressional Meddling, and S

2012]

ONGOING REFORM AT THE SEC?

465

the succeeding Subparts.
a. Independence
“A private consulting organization provides an external review and
reasonably objective viewpoint that can support the credibility of the
process and findings.”102 Dispassionate analysis is, as a general matter,
the external evaluator’s stock in trade.103 The independent nature of an
external evaluator’s review also may provide fresh ideas based on the
evaluator’s own experiences in other contexts (rather than relying on the
ideas of internal constituents), which can have both benefits and
drawbacks.104
Congressional concern about the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of
SEC regulation and the actual and possible future effects of the SEC’s
reform efforts make an independent review of both the SEC’s operations
and its reform program desirable (if not necessary). Although Congress
did not define what it meant in its requirement that the SEC hire an
“independent” consultant, as an external evaluator, BCG has at least
facial independence from the SEC. The BCG Report does note,
however, that its knowledge and experience derives from work with
other regulators and with entities overseen by the SEC.105
b. Expertise
An agency may not have or be able to afford to retain staff with
program evaluation expertise.106 The SEC hires significant numbers of
professionals versed in varied research areas. However, it is unclear
whether any SEC personnel (with the one notable exception of the
Office of the Inspector General, which serves as a somewhat

102. Id. at 96; see also Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 14 (“If an
evaluator is independent of the program, then stakeholders may be more likely to accept the findings as
objective and valid. Therefore, this independence can enhance the credibility of both the evaluator and
the ultimate evaluation results.”); Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 145
(“External evaluators are assumed to be more impartial than internal evaluators; because they have no
stake in the evaluation results, their findings are more likely to be accepted as objective and valid.”);
Millery, supra note 22, at 69 (“[E]xternal evaluators can lend objectivity and credibility to the
evaluation study”).
103. See WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 18 (“Seldom is there . . . much reason to question the
objectivity of the external evaluator . . . and this dispassionate perspective is perhaps her greatest
asset.”).
104. But cf. Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 146 (noting that an
external evaluator may, for example, need to put more effort into building relationships with
stakeholders “in order to assure them that their input will be incorporated into the planning process.”).
105. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 11.
106. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 87–88.
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independent, expert internal evaluator107) have relevant program
evaluation expertise, even if it were otherwise advantageous for the SEC
to conduct its own internal evaluation of its operations and reform
program.108 However, an agency can “gain the expertise needed to
conduct a thorough evaluation . . . [by engaging] a consulting firm or
private company that specializes in research.”109 The text of Section
967 specifies the expertise that Congress required the external evaluator
to have.
Specifically, under Section 967, the SEC was required to hire a firm
with “expertise in organizational restructuring and the operations of
capital markets,” not an expertise in program evaluation. According to
the BCG Report, BCG was retained by the SEC based on BCG’s
“knowledge and experience in securities markets, organizational design,
people management, and technology—for both public and private sector
clients.”110 A review of BCG’s Web site indicates self-assessed
competencies in those (and other relevant) areas, with the notable
exception of securities markets.111 BCG is a leading global business
consulting group, and BCG was retained in 2003 to conduct a
comparative study of the Russian securities market112 (and more recently
107. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 95–
97 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2011
ANNUAL REPORT] (describing the function and evaluation activities of the SEC Office of the Inspector
General); see also WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 21 (noting the relatively independent internal
evaluation function of the federal Offices of the Inspectors General); SEC 2011 Annual Report, supra,
at 47 (noting that in 2011, the SEC Office of the Inspector General “conducted 14 audits and
reviews . . . [covering] 17 of the 35 assessable units (49 percent).”).
108. The SEC has engaged in internal evaluations of its programs in the past, at least on a limited
basis. See, e.g., SEC 2011 Annual Report, supra note 107, at 88, 99 (describing a pilot performance
management system in the Division of Enforcement and general internal assessment efforts).
109. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 96.
110. BCG Report, supra note 4, at 11.
CONSULTING
GROUP,
111. See,
e.g.,
Information
Technology,
BOSTON
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/information_technology/default.aspx (last visited
Apr.
7,
2013);
Program
Management,
BOSTON
CONSULTING
GROUP,
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/operations/program_management/default.aspx (last
visited
Apr.
7,
2013);
Public
Sector,
BOSTON
CONSULTING
GROUP,
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/industries/public_sector/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
Although there is no indication on the Web site of expertise in “securities markets,” there is evidence of
self-reported related knowledge and experience in corporate finance, financial institutions, and the
private equity industry.
See Corporate Finance, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP,
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/corporate_finance/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7,
2013);
Financial
Institutions,
BOSTON
CONSULTING
GROUP,
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/industries/financial_institutions/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7,
2013);
Private
Equity,
BOSTON
CONSULTING
GROUP,
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/industries/private_equity/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/corporate_finance/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7,
2013).
112. Boston Consulting Group to Study Russian Securities Market, MONDOVISIONE (Sept. 16,
2003),
http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/boston-consulting-group-to-study-

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/3

24

Heminway: Desire, Conservatism, Underfunding, Congressional Meddling, and S

2012]

ONGOING REFORM AT THE SEC?

467

by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation “to conduct a business
case study for reducing the current T+3 settlement cycle for equities and
certain debt securities in the United States”).113 However, direct
evidence of BCG’s expertise in capital markets or securities markets is
not readily available.
Two concerns emerge from these observations about the
congressional mandate under Section 967 that the SEC retain a
consultant with specified required areas of expertise. First, in drafting
Section 967, Congress did not address the need for a consultant with
program evaluation expertise. Instead, Congress focused exclusively on
substantive areas of expertise relating to the SEC’s operational mission.
More well-considered legislative drafting (reflecting, among other
things, the need for a consultant with expertise in program evaluation)
would remedy this type of error in the future. Second, it is unclear
whether the SEC complied in full with the congressional mandate to hire
a consultant with expertise in capital markets, based on a review of
BCG’s Web site and other publicly available information. The
congressional requirements for substantive expertise in Section 967 are
somewhat vague in this regard (as to what constitutes expertise in the
operations of capital markets), and Section 967 includes no express
institutionalized manner of vetting the qualifications of the consultant
(although an informal system for checking qualifications may have been
established, and Congress retained oversight ex post by requiring that it
receive a copy of the report).
c. Efficacious Use of Agency Resources
Congress, in drafting Section 967 to require the retention of an
external evaluator, may also have wanted to keep SEC staff members
engaged with the operation of the agency, given that the Dodd–Frank
Act requires the SEC’s engagement with significant rule making and
other regulatory pursuits. Although all program evaluations are
distracting to agency operations (in that staff members must participate
in the process, taking them away from their regular operating activities),
an internal evaluator typically would be required to devote substantial
time to designing and implementing a program evaluation and may
have—or be perceived to have—a stake in certain evaluation outcomes

russian-securities-market/.
113. Christopher Gohlke, DTCC and Boston Consulting Group Explore US Settlement Switch,
TRADE
(May
23,
2012),
THE
http://www.thetradenews.com/News/Operations___Technology/Clearing___settlement/DTCC_and_Bos
ton_Consulting_Group_explore_US_settlement_switch.aspx.
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that impacts program operations.114 Specifically, actual or perceived
interest in the outcomes of the program evaluation may both
compromise the evaluator’s ability to conduct an independent review
and create certain expectations for the evaluator and other stakeholders
(including agency staff) that have the potential to disrupt the operations
of the project under study and the agency more broadly.115
As a general matter, program evaluations can be highly political and
threatening, and the context can make them more so.116 Staff may not
trust the results of an internal evaluator’s assessment and may resist
implementing reforms consistent with the study findings of an internal
evaluator.117 On the other hand, agency staff members are more
knowledgeable about the program at the outset (or at least may be more
knowledgeable) and often already have connections with the
stakeholders whose participation is needed for an effective evaluation.118
No doubt, given the significant regulatory burdens of the SEC in the
wake of the Madoff affair, the financial crisis, and the additional
regulatory burdens of the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress reasoned that an
efficient process that disrupts agency activities as little as possible and
results in effectual implementation was attractive.
d. Compliance with Reporting Deadlines
The retention of an external evaluator also “may gain the agency an
evaluator with the ability to respond to a request in a timely manner and
to meet the time frames and requirements associated with funding and
agency decision making.”119 Because Section 967 calls for the
evaluation report to be issued within 150 days after retention of the
evaluator, timing was an issue. Staff time was in short supply because
of the SEC’s significant engagement with rulemaking and enforcement
activities, together with its participation in numerous congressionally
mandated studies.120

114. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 88; see also ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 381
(noting that one researcher warns internal evaluators “against confusing the interests of the organization
with those of individual administrators with whom they identify personally”).
115. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 88; see also ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 381.
116. See ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 378–85; see also Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation
Planning, supra note 80, at 12–13.
117. See Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 145–46 (noting that
program staff may “distrust the evaluation and become less than cooperative in planning and
implementing it” when it is conducted by an internal evaluator).
118. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 86–87; see also Millery, supra note 22, at 69.
119. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 96.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19.
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e. Serving Two Masters?
Finally, it is significant to note that the program evaluation sponsor is
requesting, but not directly paying for, the study. The U.S. Congress
has defined the basic contents of the SEC’s program evaluation,121 but
Section 967 calls for the SEC to hire the evaluator.122 So, while
Congress is the sponsor of the evaluation, the SEC is the funder. Both
staffing and funding arrangements can impact the nature and conduct of
a program evaluation process.123
Program evaluators, like other service professionals, exist to provide
valuable services to clients.124 They owe ethical responsibilities to these
clients.125 Accordingly, the program evaluator must determine who the
client is.126
As an evaluation sponsor, Congress requested the study, scripted out
its basic contents, and, along with the SEC, designated itself as a
recipient of the resulting report.127 Congress holds the SEC accountable
through ongoing reporting.128 BCG serves the needs of Congress as the
sponsor of the evaluation; Congress appears to be the client in this
engagement. Yet, the SEC is in some senses also a client to whom some
ethical responsibilities are owed—not merely because it funds the study,
but also because the study serves the agency’s needs.129
The manner in which Section 967 is drafted and the nature of the
evaluation sponsor, agency, and evaluation process create potential
challenges for BCG as the external evaluator. The SEC and BCG were
required to work together to carry out the study required by Section 967,
independent of Congress, despite Congress’s role as the evaluation
sponsor.130 Congress and the SEC may have different agendas, and they
may play out in a political way in the evaluation process. “[P]rogram
evaluation is almost always conducted in a political arena. A finding

121. See supra Part II(A).
122. See supra text accompanying note 98.
123. See WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 19; see also Millery, supra note 22, at 68–69.
124. See generally KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 41 (“The primary responsibility of
professionals is to conduct their work in such a manner as to promote the well-being of clients.”).
125. See id. (“There is an ethical imperative to provide interventions/programs/services that
promote the well-being of clients; thus, determining if and to what extent such help is taking place is an
ethical imperative . . . .”).
126. See id. at 42 (identifying this question).
127. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)–(b).
128. Id. § 967(c).
129. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 57 (“Evaluators have the ethical responsibility to
conduct themselves in a manner that is directed by the best interests of the project.”).
130. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing
different types of relationships between evaluators and sponsors and describing the roles played by
each).
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that pleases one group may make another group unhappy . . . .
[P]olitical pressures will vary in strength, depending on what is at
stake.”131 With a distant sponsor and a close working relationship
between the evaluator and the agency, communications regarding the
evaluation questions, process design and implementation,
methodologies, and results may not adequately take into account the
congressional viewpoint—to the extent that a bicameral legislature can
identify and articulate a single viewpoint. This makes for awkward and
potentially inefficient communications as the study is designed and
implemented. Also, biases may be introduced through sponsorships and
funding arrangements that may compromise independence and
impartiality.132 “The wise evaluator will be sensitive to any factors
(political or otherwise) that can affect his or her judgment.”133
Accordingly, in its work for the SEC initiated at Congress’s behest,
BCG was put in a tough position—one in which it likely had to guard
against being predisposed to adopt or favor SEC attitudes or viewpoints
because of its role, and the roles of Congress and the SEC, in the
program evaluation process under Section 967.134
2. The Design and Implementation of the Program Evaluation
There is no single way to conduct a program evaluation in a particular
context. It would be presumptive to offer a substantive critique of
BCG’s process in conducting the program evaluation required under
Section 967 without the benefit of an in-depth expert analysis.
However, it is possible for a non-expert to use norms reflected in
program evaluation literature to identify areas of potential concern
relating to the program evaluation process designed and implemented by
BCG to comply with the requirements of Section 967. A separate
critique of the BCG Report is important (if not essential) in an
assessment of the program evaluation mandated under Section 967. The
report is an integral part of the process and observations about it, like
observations about other parts of the program evaluation process under
131. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 382.
132. See Millery, supra note 22, at 69 (“The evaluator should be aware of the potential biases
introduced by the various evaluator-sponsors, and evaluation funding arrangements and should clarify
roles and relationships early in the planning process.”).
133. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 382.
134. Congressional and SEC attitudes or viewpoints may be transparent and public. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying note 12 (observing the SEC’s desire for reform and overall conservatism);
Jessica Holzer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Addressing Gaps in Analysis, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2012),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304818404577348101006567024.html
(noting congressional frustration with the SEC’s incomplete economic analyses of rulemaking and
missed regulatory deadlines). However, some attitudes and viewpoints may be harder to identify and
guard against.
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Section 967, may identify both weaknesses in the Section 967 program
evaluation and a better way forward in future assessments of agency
reform efforts.
In Section 967, Congress delineates five principal areas of study: “the
internal operations” of the SEC;135 the “structure” of the SEC;136 the
“funding” of the SEC;137 “the need for comprehensive reform of the
SEC;”138 and “the SEC’s relationship with and the reliance on selfregulatory organizations and other entities relevant to the regulation of
securities and the protection of securities investors that are under the
SEC’s oversight.”139 Congress then sets forth seven items that must be
included in the study.140 The BCG Report summarizes these mandates
(indicating its awareness of them), notes that the SEC specifies four
broad areas for study “consistent with Dodd–Frank,” and cites to the
SEC’s “Statement of Work Form” as support for conducting its study in
these four broad areas.141
The four areas for study include
“Organization structure,”142 “Personnel and resources,”143 “Technology
and resources,”144 and “Relationship with SROs.”145 The BCG Report
identifies BCG’s focus in each area of study.146 The four areas of study
appear to be appropriately cast to meet the congressional mandates in
Section 967. However, because Section 967 includes more detail than
these summaries, there is a possibility that the changes made by the SEC
and BCG misinterpret Congress’s intent and inadvertently exclude
certain matters from study.
BCG also notes certain limitations to the scope of its study:
To carry out its mission, the SEC requires both a regulatory framework
with clear authorizations, as well as a robust set of internal capabilities to
fulfill this mandate. This study focuses on the latter. An analysis of the
legal framework, regulatory philosophy, or performance of the SEC
against its mission is beyond the scope of this study.147

These limitations seem appropriate under the circumstances (avoiding
the need for an analysis of the SEC’s legal mandate and authority) and,
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 76.
See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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as a result, neatly dodge some of the more significant political issues
that led to the enactment of Section 967.
After establishing these preliminary matters, the BCG Report then
offers details on its program evaluation design and implementation.
BCG’s study of the SEC had four sequenced steps (modules). First,
BCG assessed the “implications of external forces,”148 reviewing
information about market-based changes and challenges impacting the
SEC. Next, BCG engaged each of the established four areas of study by
learning about the current state and perceived future needs of the SEC,
conducting a gap analysis between the SEC’s current state and three
separate metrics (“best practices,” “external benchmarks,” and “new
requirements”), and developing related recommendations.149 Then, after
combining and assimilating the recommendations from the four areas of
study, BCG finalized its written report.150
Reflecting back on the general steps in the prototypical program
evaluation process described in Part I,151 BCG appears to be engaging in
practices that are closely aligned with standard program evaluation
methods. By assessing the implications of external forces and
undertaking to understand the current state and perceived future needs of
the SEC, BCG conceptualized and operationalized the four areas of
study and the evaluation questions within them.152 Its activities in this
regard closely follow the basic steps of a standard program evaluation
process—assessing context, gathering reconnaissance, engaging
stakeholders, describing the program, and focusing the evaluation.153
BCG’s reported activities also supported its choices of methodologies,
sample selection, and data collection, management, and analysis, all of
which are consonant with recognized stages in a program evaluation
process.154
The “methodologies and tools” used by BCG reflect attentiveness to
program evaluation processes described in the literature. Methods and
instruments used in program evaluation are chosen to address
information needs that correspond and respond to the evaluation

148. Id. at 13.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 14.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.
152. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 16 (“[E]valuators will typically employ social research
procedures for gathering, analyzing, and interpreting evidence about the performance of a program.”).
153. See PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 2 (setting forth the five steps in the Evaluation
Planning Incorporating Context (EPIC) model: “(1) assess context, (2) gather reconnaissance, (3)
engage stakeholders, (4) describe the program, and (5) focus the evaluation.”); see also Holden &
Zimmerman, Overview and Analysis, supra note 32, at 145–51 (summarizing and commenting on the
five steps in the EPIC model). See supra note 32.
154. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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questions and the type and level of evaluation in the context of the
program being evaluated. “[A]gency factors influence the choice and
implementation of various methodologies.”155 The evaluator must
determine the basic information needed to effectively answer each
evaluation question and must identify whether and, if so, how that
information may be obtained.156
Evaluators must often innovate and improvise as they attempt to find
ways to gather credible, defensible evidence . . . . The circumstances
surrounding specific programs, and the particular issues the evaluator is
called on to address, frequently compel evaluators to compromise and
adapt textbook methodological standards. The challenges to the evaluator
are to match the research procedures to the evaluation questions and
circumstances as well as possible and, whatever procedures are used, to
apply them at the highest possible standard feasible to those questions
and circumstances.157

To make this connection between evaluation questions and evaluation
methodologies, an evaluator may begin by interviewing important
stakeholders to assemble a composite picture of each program being
studied.158 “These interviews are typically informal and unstructured
and usually include a series of basic questions that encourage
stakeholders to tell the evaluator about the more significant aspects of
the program from their point of view.”159
After meeting with key stakeholders, the evaluator thoroughly reviews
program documentation and other literature related to the program and its
proposed outcomes. At the same time, the evaluator may interview key
staff and program stakeholders to understand the history and evolution of
the program, develop logic models or conceptual frameworks to visually
depict how the program is thought to function, and create tools that begin
to specify the potential issues of interest for the evaluation.160

This picture of the program enables the evaluation by setting baseline
descriptions of the operation of the program (sometimes collected in the
form of a program logic model summarizing the program’s resources,
activities, processes, and outcomes161), connecting (as and if applicable)
155. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 34.
156. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 27 (“The evaluator needs
to assess each question to determine if data sources for answering it are available or if the available
resources allow for collection of those data sources.”).
157. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 17.
158. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 133–34 (“At the beginning of an evaluation project, it
is fairly standard to ask a variety of stakeholders, people with an interest in the program . . . about the
program.”).
159. Id. at 134.
160. Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 20–21.
161. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 136–50 (describing and illustrating how differing
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the program to its greater public context,162 and helping the agency and
evaluator identify the information that is needed to answer the
evaluation questions and potential sources of that information.163 This
program description creates a foundation for the study.
The process that BCG undertook to learn about the operations and
requirements of the SEC and the related gap analyses164 both launched
and comprised part of BCG’s assessment of the SEC. This process
consisted of document review and analysis and interviews and
discussions with various stakeholders.165 Based on the information
BCG obtained from these activities, BCG employed various
methodologies and assessment tools to conduct necessary and desirable
analyses of the acquired data.166
BCG’s design and implementation of the SEC study under Section
967 appear to be both identifiable as program evaluation and consistent
with the rigor expected of good program evaluation. The design of the
study is directed at the matters called out by Congress for analysis, and
the planning and conduct of the study follow recognizable program
evaluation patterns. However, a more substantive analysis of BCG’s
study design and implementation is advisable given the required
diversion of resources by the SEC as the subject and object of the
process. A valid program evaluation process should generate valid
results that can be used to improve the structure and operations of the
SEC.167 A faulty program evaluation process may be manifested
through a suboptimal evaluation design and report and may result in an
inefficient use of agency resources.
3. The BCG Report
Program evaluation processes culminate with the issuance of reports.
“Once the evaluation has been completed, the information needs to be
shared in a manner that will most likely complement its eventual use.”168
viewpoints about a program can be fashioned into a program logic model and used to assess the
program).
162. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 21–22 (describing how
the information in a program logic model may be “collated, collected and integrated to form a
conceptual model of the intended processes of the program.”).
163. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 150–54 (describing and illustrating how a program
logic model can help identify information needs and potential and actual information sources).
164. See supra text accompanying note 149.
165. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 14.
166. See id. at 14–18. The analyses are described in detail in the Appendix included as chapter 7
of the BCG Report. See id. at 155–260.
167. See generally KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 29 (“[T]he purpose of a program
evaluation is the generation of quality information for the improvement of services.”).
168. Id. at 325.
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These reports have somewhat standardized components: an introduction
(which may include or consist of an executive summary of the report); a
literature review; a description of the study methodologies, findings, and
recommendations; and relevant appendices.169 The structure of the BCG
Report conforms to this normative description. It comprises seven
chapters: an executive summary; chapters on the scope of and approach
to the study, the context of the study, BCG’s assessment of each area of
study, the strategic direction of the SEC, and recommended initiatives;
and an appendix including details and a glossary.170
To be most effective, the process of producing the evaluation report
should engage key stakeholders:
End users of information can be great resources in the overall report
production process. Reports are often produced in stages, a format that
provides an opportunity for feedback and discussion of findings before a
final report is disseminated. Evaluators develop and give users a draft of
the evaluation report for feedback. The reviews of the draft report
usually generate valuable discussion about the findings and possible use,
as well as the actual written product.171

The BCG Report indicates that a draft version of the report was
produced during the third module of the study and finalized in the fourth
module.172 Although the BCG Report does not indicate that feedback
was solicited from key personnel at the SEC (or Congress) before the
report was finalized, BCG’s work may also have conformed to this
standard practice. Congress can evaluate this aspect of the study
process, if it desires to do so, through the mandated system of postevaluation reporting it established in Section 967.
C. Post-Evaluation Implementation and Periodic Reports
Section 967 institutes a post-evaluation reporting system designed to
allow Congress to remain informed about the SEC’s implementation of
BCG’s recommendations.173 Section 967 calls for the SEC to report to
Congress every six months during the two-year period after the release
of the BCG Report.174 This reporting schedule presumably is designed
to ensure that the evaluation process and report are appropriately
utilized, a common concern in program evaluation processes.175
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 333–34; ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 395–404.
See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 3–4 (the table of contents of the report).
KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 332.
BCG REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(c).
Id.
See ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 410 (“One of the most disappointing things that can
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Imagine that the evaluators have brought a full bucket of water to the
project leader on a scorching hot day. Someone has to reflect on how the
water will be used and then take action to pour it into glasses, drink it, use
it to water the plants, or bathe with it, otherwise it will just sit there and
evaporate until it is no longer useful to anyone.176

The post-evaluation process described in Section 967 is part of a
“feedback loop” that ties the agency’s “internal learning” to “external
sharing” with stakeholders.177 By inserting this feedback loop in Section
967, Congress (whether unwittingly or purposefully) broadly invoked
the spirit, even if not the letter, of utilization-focused evaluation by
explicitly investing the SEC in the evaluation process.178
In any evaluation there are many potential stakeholders and an array of
possible uses. Utilization-focused evaluation requires moving from the
general and abstract, i.e., possible audiences and potential uses, to the real
and specific, i.e., actual primary intended users and their explicit
commitments to concrete, specific uses. The evaluator facilitates
judgment and decision making by intended users rather than acting as a
distant, independent judge. Since no evaluation can be value-free,
utilization-focused evaluation answers the question of whose values will
frame the evaluation by working with clearly identified, primary intended
users who have responsibility to apply evaluation findings and implement
recommendations.179

The inclusion of this aspect of program evaluation in Section 967 has
apparent benefits in, among other things, fostering transparency in a way
that better assures the accountability of the SEC and Congress to the
public and better ensures the ongoing use of BCG’s findings and
recommendations, enhancing prospects for SEC reform in accordance
with those findings and recommendations.180 Although it may be that
BCG in fact employed a utilization-focused evaluation process, more
conscious and explicit focus by Congress in Section 967 on the
utilization of the SEC study would have better ensured that a utilizationhappen to an evaluator is that the evaluation report . . . is placed on a bookshelf or filed away to be
seldom noticed or referred to again.”); see also Michael Quinn Patton, Utilization-Focused Evaluation,
in EVALUATION MODELS: VIEWPOINTS ON EDUCATIONAL AND HUMAN SERVICES EVALUATION 425
(D.L. Stufflebeam et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
176. CHEYANNE CHURCH & MARK M. ROGERS, DESIGNING FOR RESULTS: INTEGRATING
MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMS 179 (2006), available at
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/ilt_manualpage.html.
177. Id.
178. See Patton, supra note 175, at 427–29 (describing the “personal factor” in utilization-focused
evaluations).
179. Id. at 425–26.
180. See generally CHURCH & ROGERS, supra note 176, at 179 (“Sharing the evaluation results
and the subsequent reflections and adaptations to the project externally increases transparency between
the organization and its stakeholders and donors.”).
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focused process was employed and the attendant potential benefits were
most fully realized.
Even absent a utilization-focused evaluation, however, there are
acknowledged steps that can be taken in the context of Section 967 to
make optimal use of BCG’s observations and employ BCG’s
recommendations. One program evaluation resource, for example,
suggests the use of a four-step process, emanating from learning theory,
to utilize the output of a program evaluation—a process that commences
during the evaluation process and extends through the issuance of the
evaluation report and into the implementation phase.
First, the project team goes through the experience of the evaluation—
preparation, evaluation plan, process, debrief and review of the final
report. The team then reflects on the conclusions and recommendations,
and generalizes the information beyond the immediate project. From
there the focus shifts to how this newly acquired knowledge should be
applied to the project or beyond. Finally, the team considers what needs
to be shared with other teams, with the broader organization, and with the
field as a whole.181

A process like this could work well with the ongoing reporting
responsibilities of the SEC under Section 967. In fact, as the SEC stated
in its first Section 967 report to Congress, the SEC did reflect on the
observations and suggestions made by BCG in the BCG Report,
generalize that information, and design an implementation plan that
engages multiple stakeholders.182 “Efforts have focused on putting the
right people, infrastructure and processes into place to support an effort
that has the potential to re-shape how the SEC executes its mission
through redefined processes, roles and responsibilities, and enhanced
engagement with internal and external stakeholders.”183 As part of this
planning process, the resulting SEC reform project was institutionalized
and named—the Mission Advancement Program, or MAP.184
In order for the agency to adopt and “own” the implementation of agreedupon BCG recommendations, a program name (moving away from “BCG
Study” or “BCG Recommendations”) was developed to give an identity
to the initiative as well as set the stage for the multi-year program. With
the adoption of an identity and vision, the program was formally
designated the “Mission Advancement Program” (MAP).
MAP
acknowledges where the agency is today and how it will continue to
move forward in support of its mission. The vision of MAP is “to
181. Id. at 180.
182. See September 2011 SEC Report, supra note 10, at 3–4, 8–25 (summarizing and detailing the
establishment of infrastructure, processes, and workflows to implement the BCG Report).
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 10.
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effectively align [the agency’s] resources against the SEC’s most critical
responsibilities and enable the SEC to continue to evolve as a premier
regulator that is agile and equipped to evolve in pace with the securities
market.”185

The SEC’s second Section 967 report to Congress describes overall
progress made in executing the four agendas represented in the MAP,186
noting improvements to SEC operations in three areas: infrastructure
reorganization, efficiency and effectiveness process review, and the
identification of cost-saving opportunities.187
However, the second Section 967 report also cautions that “[h]aving
completed the initial stages of review and analysis, it is anticipated that
the level of activity related to MAP projects will be reduced in FY
2012.”188 The report identifies the reasons for this abatement.189
Staff and management time to devote to this initiative will continue to be
in short supply, and future phases of implementation are likely to require
levels of funding that must be directed at other agency priorities at this
time. For this reason, future activity will be focused on a limited number
of projects from among those initiatives described below based on an
assessment of their relative potential for operational impact or cost
savings. In the coming months, the working groups will continue to
assess the changes suggested by BCG to refine and identify those that
would provide the most benefit to the SEC and the public.190

Later in the report, the SEC explains these challenges in greater detail
and notes a third, related challenge: limits on the SEC’s ability to
effectively absorb and manage change.191 The report concludes:
The last six months have seen notable progress as agency staff have
worked to solve problems and initiate tangible improvements in people,
process and technology domains. However, the agency faces an
extraordinary workload and resource demands in the coming months and
will necessarily be selective in pursuing further only those initiatives that
will result in measureable efficiency and effectiveness gains or cost
savings.192

This conclusion and the challenges it reflects represent a somewhat
sobering reality in the program evaluation process required and fostered

185. Id.
186. See March 2012 SEC Report, supra note 10, at 7–59.
187. Id. at 4–5.
188. Id. at 5.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 60–62 (describing challenges involving financial and human resources and change
absorption).
192. Id. at 62.
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under Section 967. The SEC has a larger and more complex mission to
fulfill as it continues the process of reforming itself. The second Section
967 report indicates that, failing the introduction of new resources, the
SEC may be forced to make difficult decisions between meeting its
regulatory mandate and pursuing its reform efforts.
The third SEC report under Section 967 was issued in October 2012.
It indicates a continued concern about balancing the SEC’s regulatory
and reform tasks, although it paints a rosier picture of these concerns
and boasts significant progress in implementing the BCG Report
recommendations.193 Specifically, the report notes (among other things)
that, “in order to balance the MAP activities with additional work
dictated by the Dodd–Frank Act, and the agency’s many other ongoing
obligations, the SEC has prioritized its efforts toward implementing
those initiatives yielding the greatest potential for more immediate
operational impact activities.”194 According to the report, “the activities
are now being executed primarily by SEC staff, with program
management support as required, resulting in a reduction in related
agency expenditures by more than 90%.”
But a different possible story is told by Representative Darrell Issa,
Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of
the U.S. House of Representatives, in a January 3, 2013 letter to
Chairman Walter.195 The letter questions the level of spending on
outside consultants in connection with the MAP and the necessity of
retaining those consultants.196 Although hearings had not been held or
scheduled to sort through the details on this matter at the time work on
this Article was completed (mid-April 2013), the combined information
in the third SEC report under Section 967 and the January letter from
Representative Issa may suggest that former Chairman Schapiro, finding
insufficient human resources within the SEC to execute on both agency
rulemaking projects under Dodd–Frank and agency reform initiatives
occasioned by the SEC Report, made the decision to retain extra human
resources in the form of outside project management consultants. Even
193. October 2012 SEC Report, supra note 10, at 44–45.
194. Id. at 45.
195. Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Elisse Walter, Chairman, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 3, 2013), at 2–3,
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/Rep.Issa.Letter.to.SEC.010313.pdf (raising concerns about
the cost of the “program management” services provided by outside consultants at Booz Allen
Hamilton, Inc. in connection with the MAP); see also Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. House Panel Probes SEC
Spending on Consultants, REUTERS (Jan 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-secconsultants-idUSBRE9030V320130104.
196. Sarah N. Lynch, As Booz Allen Consults SEC Critics Question Cost, REUTERS (March 1,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/booz-allen-sec_n_1311905.html (stating that the
retention of the consultants “was essential because the SEC simply did not have the manpower or
experts on hand to conduct the follow-up work”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

37

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

480

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

in the face of an ostensibly well-grounded rationale of this kind,
however, the ongoing management and oversight of the consultants’
activities and cost would be at issue. Of course, a thinly staffed SEC
also might make this type of management and oversight impossible . . . .
At the time work on this Article was completed, the final report of the
SEC under Section 967 had not yet been issued. Perhaps this final
report will shed further light on the question of resource allocations
made in connection with Section 967 compliance. Perhaps it will not.
In any event, the financial and human resources expended in
implementing a reform plan through a mandated reporting system may
be significant.
III. CONCLUSION
I started my research on this Article wondering whether Section 967
represented a positive development in the SEC’s ongoing efforts at
reform. I knew from my prior work that the SEC had a desire for reform
and had made progress in instituting its own program of reform in the
absence of a congressional pronouncement.197 In the early days after the
adoption of the Dodd–Frank Act, I identified certain potential positive
effects of Section 967 on the SEC’s reform efforts based on elements of
change leadership literature.198 I questioned, however, whether the
SEC’s conservatism,199—together with (potentially) the under-resourced
environment in which the SEC currently operates,200 the nature and
extent of Congress’s engagement with the reform effort through Section
967,201 and the sheer weight of the number of studies and reports that
involve the SEC as provided under the Dodd–Frank Act, the JOBS Act,
and the STOCK Act (not to mention the weight of rule-making and
enforcement obligations under these laws and otherwise)202—might
negatively impact the SEC’s change momentum. After fumbling for an
assessment rubric that might help me to assess the efficacy of Section
967, I turned to the literature on program evaluation, which seemed to
most closely describe the context in which Section 967 was intended to
operate. To ensure that I was headed down the right path, I consulted
public administration literature to confirm that program evaluation
operated in that context as well as in the private sector.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when viewed through the lens of program
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
See supra text accompanying notes 17–19.
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evaluation, Section 967 gets mixed reviews. On the one hand, Section
967 successfully engages the basic elements of program evaluation, and
BCG executed on those basic elements in a manner that comports with
descriptions of valid program evaluation in the relevant literature. On
the other hand, BCG’s work may or may not be of high quality (there is
no plan for or apparent expertise in a substantive evaluation of BCG’s
work), and the specifics of Section 967 raise some interesting, and
potentially important, issues from a program evaluation standpoint. Part
II of this Article covers these points in detail.
For instance, Congress could have been more precise in framing its
evaluation questions—the matters to be studied—to clarify the purpose
of the evaluation mandated under Section 967 and the outcomes of
interest to it. This is especially important given the relatively distant
nature of Congress as a program evaluation sponsor and the SEC’s
multiple roles as funder, subject, and object of the program evaluation.
Additional specificity and related congressional guidance on the
evaluation questions would have established a more robust foundation
for the type and level of evaluation to be conducted and the information
needs to be met by the evaluation process. Further, more precise
evaluation questions may have bolstered BCG’s independence in
conducting the evaluation.
Also, while the specification of an external evaluator has salient
advantages in the context of the program evaluation required under
Section 967, the directive on the retention of an appropriate consultant
in Section 967 could have specified the need to hire a consultant with
program evaluation expertise and could have better described what
constitutes “expertise . . . in the operation of capital markets.”203
Although there may have been no detriment suffered in this case as a
result of these deficiencies, they may contribute to the retention of the
wrong type of evaluator.
Finally, the program evaluation process mandated under Section 967
could have been expressly designed to more comprehensively bring into
play a utilization-focused program evaluation process, working in more
explicit, pervasive feedback loops between BCG and the SEC to better
ensure short-term and long-term use of BCG’s observations and
recommendations. Although the post-evaluation reporting system
ensures that the SEC will address with Congress its use of these outputs
for a period of two years, the reform process is likely to extend beyond
that period. The tone of the second Section 967 report is decidedly
cautious and evidences a conservative approach to implementing

203. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1).
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reforms on an ongoing basis.204 Having said that, however, the SEC’s
first three Section 967 reports indicate that it is committed to continue
the process of reform subject to its ability to do so given the SEC’s
capacity to absorb and manage change and competing needs for the
SEC’s human and money capital. These efforts, however, come at a
cost, and that cost includes the allocation of internal or external human
capital to ongoing reporting and implementation mandates. Whether the
SEC’s desire for positive change survives and its reform program thrives
to bring the SEC to new regulatory heights—in light of its conservatism,
underfunding, need to continue to comply with the reporting mandates
of Section 967, and accumulated study fatigue—remains to be seen.
Moreover, the overall costs and benefits of the reform efforts mandated
under Section 967 have not yet been assessed, and it is unclear whether
plans for that type of comprehensive assessment exist.
In sum, while program evaluation literature provides a touchstone for
making observations about whether Section 967 is an effectual piece of
legislation, the non-expert observations that can be made on the basis of
that literature are necessarily limited. This Article does not permit a
conclusion, for example, as to whether the reform efforts undertaken in
response to the BCG Report result in short-term or long-term benefits to
investors, issuers, or others served by the SEC’s programmatic mission
or as to whether the aggregate benefits of Section 967 exceed its total
costs.
Yet, the literature on program evaluation underscores its potential
importance as a tool of responsible, effective administration and
oversight of government programs.
[T]he role of evaluation is to provide answers to questions about a
program that will be useful and will actually be used. This point is
fundamental to evaluation—its purpose is to inform action. An
evaluation, therefore, primarily addresses the audience (or, more
accurately, audiences) with the potential to make decisions and take
action on the basis of the evaluation results. The evaluation findings may
assist such persons to make go/no-go decisions about specific program
modifications or, perhaps, about initiation or continuation of entire
programs.
They may bear on political, practical, and resource
considerations or make an impression on the views of individuals with
influence. They may have direct effects on judgments of a program’s
value as part of an oversight process that holds the program accountable
for results. Or they may have indirect effects in shaping the way program
issues are framed and the nature of the debate about them.205

Accordingly, program evaluation should be used more consciously and
204. See, e.g., text accompanying note 180.
205. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 20.
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on an informed, consistent basis—not just for the purpose of gauging
SEC reform, but also for the overall assessment of government
programs, including federal agency operations and reform efforts.
The conscious, informed, and consistent use of program evaluation
will require, however, a sharpened focus on important unresolved
questions underlying federal agencies and their activities—questions
about the nature of efficient and efficacious agency operations and
regulation. These questions have economic, political, and social roots
and implications too complex to digest here. But without attention to
these important questions, congressionally sponsored program
evaluation is an unanchored ship adrift in the vast sea of our federal
government.206
In an imaginary, idealized world free of transaction costs, agency
costs, political biases, and cognitive biases, a thoughtful, engaged
program evaluation process would support and strengthen agency
initiatives like the SEC’s pre-existing reform program to the betterment
of the overall regulatory scheme and for the benefit of its protected
individuals and groups. Because our world is not free from these costs
and biases, however, Congress should ensure, before it mandates
expenditures for an agency program evaluation, that it participates in the
sponsorship of that program evaluation in an aware, advised manner,
sensitive to the potential intricacies, benefits, and perils of that
evaluation process. Congress can develop (through internal talent or by
retaining outside experts) structures and protocols for the conduct of
federal agency program evaluations and appropriate rubrics and tools
(including detailed, context-driven checklists of the components of a
quality program evaluation) to assess the efficacy of those program
evaluations in different contexts.207 This Article expresses support for
the thoughtful development of those structures, protocols, rubrics, and
tools as a means of better ensuring the optimal use of program
evaluations in public administration at the federal level.

206. Cf. RUEGG & FELLER, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that the institutionalization of program
evaluation in the U.S federal government “is not synonymous with acceptance, quality, credibility, or
impact.”).
207. The GAO’s GAGAS for use in performance audits may provide some guidance in this
regard. See supra note 44.
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